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Introduction
Suppose a citizen and resident of Kenya, let's call her Yasmine, is fearful of disease, drought, and ethnic violence, and knows she has only the
most minimal prospects for a healthy, prosperous, and happy life if she
remains at home. In a moment of naive optimism she decides to seek a
better life in the United States. Perhaps she hopes to get a job and obtain
an education for herself and her children. Under present U.S. immigration
policy and law, she would be turned away. In the early part of the 20th
century, and the late part of the 19th century, my grandparents and many
of yours, had similar aspirations and, remarkably, were able to fulfill them.
Those were the good old days.
Thabo Mbeki, the President of South Africa, described the present
international distribution of wealth in terms of "global apartheid." We
might understand this phrase as describing a circumstance in which the
t Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University. I appreciate research suggestions, and comments on earlier drafts,
from participants in the Cornell International Law Journal Symposium on Global
Justice, as well as research assistance by Mikael Lurie.
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legal system is used to lock certain people into a position of poverty, inequality, and disenfranchisement, or artificially to separate groups of people. Under apartheid, the accident of birth into a particular race radically
affected one's life opportunities. Under the present international system,
the accident of birth into a particular nationality has a similar effect. Is
there a difference beyond scale?
The iconic American political philosopher John Rawls' would seem to
accept global apartheid, with a limited duty of inter-state assistance that is
not intended to lift the poor out of poverty and sharply limited rights to
immigrate. Until 1993, with the publication of The Law of Peoples,2 Rawls
seemed simply to assume closed societies, isolated from other societies, as
a modeling device rather than as a normative commitment. 3 In The Law of
Peoples, Rawls sought to defend closed societies, principally on moral haz4
ard grounds.
I am interested in the economic problems of trade, immigration, and
redistribution, and how we understand our ethical duties to one another in
these fields. My argument will support a position that seems intuitively
appealing to me and many others, but which we must recognize is revolutionary: that borders are artificial and, therefore, should not be accepted as
determinative of ethical duties or life opportunity. 5 This argument applies
differently in the diverse areas of trade, immigration, and redistribution,
but these areas are systemically related.
I.

Crossing Disciplinary Borders: Philosophy, Law, Politics, and
Economics

The question of our ethical duty to people across political borders cannot be answered except through interdisciplinary analysis. So, in order to
evaluate the ethical meaning of political borders, it is necessary to transcend disciplinary borders. The disciplines that contribute include, in
alphabetical order, economics, history, law, philosophy, and politics. I
1. In using Rawls's work as a basis and as a foil, I follow a long tradition. "Rawls's
A Theory of Justice is generally considered to be the most complete and systematic
account of a rights-based justice in contemporary philosophy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the important attempts at developing a systematic theory of global justice have
been attempts at 'globalizing' Rawls's theory of justice." KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM 54 (2004).
2. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36 (1993), revised and
expanded in JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
3. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 8 (1971) ("I shall be satisfied if it is possible to
formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived
for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies ....
It is natural to
conjecture that once we have a sound theory for this case, the remaining problems of
justice will prove more tractable in the light of it."); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 12
(1995).
4. "Moral hazard" is an economic concept describing a circumstance in which individuals do not bear the full adverse consequences of their decisions, and so may have
perverse incentives to act in a way that diminishes social welfare.
5. For a similar perspective, see Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders, 51 UCLA L. REv.
193 (2003).
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claim expertise only in international law. This disciplinary limitation,
under which we all labor to greater or lesser extents, validates the idea of
this conference. Legal pragmatism and social science empiricism can help
philosophers to develop more nuanced models.
Boundaries of thought may induce us to pay undue respect to territorial borders. And, in fact, once we cross boundaries of thought, we see that
territorial borders are also just boundaries of thought: international lawyers, like astronauts, understand that territorial borders are historically
and legally contingent constructs, albeit with important real consequences. 6 Let us briefly map the relevant boundaries of thought.
Integration between philosophy and law in this context involves a twoway trade. Non-lawyers may be surprised to learn that lawyers are severely
limited in their ability to deal with issues of justice. Law in general, and
international law in particular, might be viewed as a fundamentally conservative discipline, embedding the distributive status quo in its concerns
for the rule of law and in its principles about the role of the state and how
law is made. The traditional, and thankfully outmoded, concerns of international law for the exclusive sovereignty and uncompromised autonomy
of states might be viewed as analogous, in a domestic setting, to an exclusive concern for protecting private property in a society in which some are
fabulously wealthy, while others live in misery, or to an argument against a
progressive income tax in order to promote the integrity of the family.
Lurking in the background of many claims about how international
law should be made or interpreted, but often lacking a discrete or even
legitimate role, is a concern for distributive justice. 7 Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell have argued, however, that adding concerns for fairness or
justice to social policy analysis necessarily (and tautologically) reduces
welfare, except insofar as individual preferences include a "preference" for
fairness or justice. 8 This economic perspective may not have practical
implications: Kaplow and Shavell importantly and correctly accept justice
and fairness as inputs through individual preferences. Furthermore, one
might extend their analysis by suggesting that individuals, in implementing
their preference for fairness or justice, may delegate the task of assessing
what is fair or just to judges, legislators, treaty writers, or other agents.
Welfare economics would, therefore, accept the possibility that such actors
may appropriately include fairness or justice in their deliberations. This
allows economists to cross a border of thought.
Economists are the kings and queens of consequentialism. 9 They have
6. SeeJules L. Coleman & Sarah K. Harding, Citizenship, the Demands of Justice, and
the Moral Relevance of Political Borders, in JUSTICE INIMMIGRATION 18 (Warren F. Schwartz
ed., 1995).
7. Frank Garcia and Fernando Teson have brought these concerns to the foreground in their work. See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Building a Just Trade Order for a New
Millennium, 33 GEO.WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1015 (2001); FERNANDO TESON, A PHILOSOPHY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).
8. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).

9. Rawls states that "[aill ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences
into account in judging rightness." RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 30.
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the strongest tools-both theoretical and empirical-by which to link cause
and effect. But they also refuse to tell us anything about our preferences:
they believe in normative and methodological individualism. They insist
that each of us is the captain of his or her own preferences. They insist on
stable and exogenous preferences. As Milton Friedman conceded, this is
an assumption that forms the basis for a methodological division of labor
10
rather than a belief about human nature.
Economic theory, including normative individualism, is hospitable to
the possibility that philosophers would advise us regarding our preferences. "Preferences" is simply an economist's word for tastes, aspirations,
and felt duties. In the liberal economic model, philosophers contribute to
the global justice project through preference modification: their job is to
help the rest of us formulate our preferences. More specifically, their job is
to help us to understand our duties. It is something of a feat of levitation
that we hire them-that we have a preference to improve our own preferences. Perhaps we also hire them to improve the preferences of others, as
agents of meddlesome preferences.
While natural law theory may incorporate substantial concerns for
broad concepts of natural justice, international lawyers have, in practice,
done little to regularize (indeed to legitimate) inquiries into distributive
justice. Perhaps this is because the vocation of law provides few tools with
which to work on issues of distributive justice.
It is bracing for lawyers to engage perspectives from less conservative,
more normatively committed, and, frankly, more imaginative disciplines
such as philosophy, politics, and economics. These disciplines can be
understood as addressing the normative question of what the law should
be, and, as only marginally engaging, if at all, the principal responsibility
of practicing lawyers: determining what the law is. Discourse about what
the law should be is, indeed, not an area where lawyers have a monopoly,
and it takes close analysis to identify the areas of lawyers' contribution.
Discourse on what the law should be is based on values and consequentialism: what do we want to achieve, and what is the best way to achieve it?
Lawyers do not have special insights into values but can contribute to the
project of consequentialism by contributing to an understanding of the
actual operation and effects of laws. Philosophers and social scientists
have stronger claims to advise voters and legislators on what the law
should be.
Philosophers have a great responsibility in the field of distributive justice. They also need the assistance of economists and lawyers, however,
because some of the philosophers' models and arguments are based on
certain understandings of formal relationships and causal relationshipsareas in which the practical expertise of lawyers and the theoretical and
empirical expertise of economists are critical inputs. Philosophers' understandings of duties are surprisingly sensitive to context, and the lawyers
and economists can help to describe the context. Economic models are
10.

MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY

13 (1962).
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especially useful for showing us how the formal institutional context may
come under pressure due to the possibility of increased welfare: increased
welfare is corrosive of institutions that block it. 1 This is why we have so
many unauthorized migrants in the United States: immigration, like free
trade, generally entails large welfare gains.
11.

Crossing Territorial Borders: Trade, Immigration, Redistribution,
and Intervention

Having divided the task among at least philosophers, lawyers and
economists, I want to focus on the factual and formal contexts of trade,
immigration, redistribution, and intervention. My goal is not to be comprehensive but to provide some of the details of these functions as they
exist in the world today, and how they may affect the position of the poor.
12
The most complex is trade.
A.

Trade

To what extent is the trade law system complicit in the creation of a
system of "global apartheid?" The evidence is ambivalent, and much will
depend on future behavior.
Trade liberalization involves, at its core, the reduction of barriers to
equal participation in commerce, so we must say at the outset that the
trade law system holds promise for reducing global apartheid. Trade law
can be revised to further extend the competitiveness of the market-to
allow poor people to compete for better wages and better livelihoods. This
would be an important component of the destruction of global apartheid,
as it reduces barriers, and it can be achieved using familiar trade law tools.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration refers market access and other issues of
interest to poor people in poor countries. However, history suggests a
degree of skepticism. As often encountered in the history of GATT and
WTO, efforts to assist poor countries-even to accept more imports from
poor countries-have been limited to cheap talk.
Furthermore, there are two possible ways in which the trade law system may perpetuate global apartheid. First, if we consider the trade law
system not in terms of its requirements of liberalization but in terms of its
permission of national barriers to movements of factors, including goods,
services, labor, and capital, in both wealthy states and poor states, we may
understand the trade law system as limiting the ability of the poor to trade
out of poverty. Is the glass half full or half empty?
Second, turning to the requirements of liberalization, if these requirements limit the ability of poor states to choose policies that will maximize
growth, and best ameliorate poverty, do they not have the effect of perpetu11. See, e.g., Senate Committee Conducts Hearing on Immigration Reform Legislation,
82 Interpreter Releases 1243, 1244 (2005) (comments of Sen. John McCain).
12. For an assessment of trade rules against certain principles of justice, see Darrel
Moellendorf, The World Trade Organization and EgalitarianJustice, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY
145 (2005).
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ating poverty? Even though the global system does not appear to have the
racist basis that South African apartheid did, it may have the effect of limiting the ability of poor people to overcome poverty, inequality of life opportunities, and disenfranchisement.
Thus, there are two main areas for work to improve the position of
3
poor people within the international trade system:'
1. Market Access in Wealthy Countries. First, it is clear that opening markets
to poor countries' products, including agricultural products, textiles, and
tropical products, is a useful and necessary means to reduce poverty,
although the magnitude of the effects of these measures is disputed. Opening developed country markets to services and labor from poor countries
would also help many poor people. Of course, while there may be winners
in poor countries, there may be losers among the poor in wealthy countries.
We must also recall that liberalization in wealthy countries may have the
effect of raising the costs of some goods to poor people in poor countries,
while it reduces the costs of some goods to poor people in wealthy countries.
2. Reform in Poor Countries and the Right to Regulate. Second, as many leading trade economists have pointed out, poor countries may achieve substan14
tial benefits from domestic reform, including trade liberalization.
Opening markets and domestic reform are motivated by efficiency.
Economic analysts sometimes speak of two mythical governmental departments: a department of efficiency and a department of distribution. The
department of efficiency is concerned with increasing the size of the pie: in
the present context, it is concerned with free trade. The department of
15
distribution is then tasked with distributing the surplus from free trade.
One of the wonderful things about economic efficiency in this context is
that it requires each individual to compete on equal terms, with benevolent
distributive results compared to a world in which the poor are artificially
prevented from competing on an equal basis. So the department of efficiency is at least somewhat supportive of the department of distribution.
A limited but useful way of reducing "global apartheid", therfore,
would be to enhance free trade, beginning with allowing poor people to
send their goods and services to wealthy countries.
B. Immigration
Let us focus on trade in labor. Joseph Carens observes that
"[clitizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of
feudal privilege-an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life
13. For a more detailed analysis, see Joel P. Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty
Agenda at the WTO: Trade Law and "Global Apartheid," 6 J.INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2003).
14. See, e.g., World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Assessing World Bank Support for Trade, 1987-2004 (2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/trade/
docs/trade evaluation.pdf.
15. A recent World Bank Independent Evaluation Group report criticized the Bank
for failing to pay sufficient attention to distributional effects in connection with its
advice to borrowers to liberalize trade. Id.

2006

Welcome to Cosmopolis

chances." 1 6 Thus, another way of reducing "global apartheid" would be to
allow workers from poor countries to take jobs in wealthier countries-the
current global system of restricted migration may be understood in at least
one dimension as a macrocosm of the internal passport system that was
used under apartheid. 1 7 Many economists have pointed out that substantial global benefit could be derived from liberalization of immigration to
allow greater mobility of labor.1 8
For millennia, human migration was unconstrained, and people and
peoples often moved to seek a better life. 1 9 While migration was a mechanism of social and biological evolution, by which stronger societies and
cultures supervened weaker ones, and human society expanded its geographic scope, it was also a mechanism of integration, forming multi-cultural societies. The U.S., which was once a nation of immigrants, only
began to restrict immigration in the 1870s. 20 Migration has been an
important path to human improvement. With the advent of national borders and legal restrictions on immigration, this path has been formally
constrained.
During the past century, global society has made important strides
the free movement of goods, money, and even some types of services. Yet,
human migration for economic and non-economic reasons remains
broadly constrained.
While the global department of efficiency has done reasonably well in
trade in goods, it has lagged in relation to immigration. There is little international law that commits states to liberalize immigration: to open their
borders to immigrants. Outside special arrangements such as the European Union, states generally remain unbound and determine their immigration policy unilaterally. This is especially strange today, when wide
differences in the global price of labor indicate that there are great welfare
gains to be made from liberalization of immigration. Given these gains,
combined with the demographic pressures in many developed countries,
we can expect increasing liberalization of immigration.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) focused on services in which wealthier countries are more competitive-financial services, telecommunications, professional services, etc. -and concentrated
16. Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL.
251, 252 (1987).
17. Howard Chang makes an explicit comparison between apartheid and restrictions on immigration: "Just as we condemn segregation at the local level for undermining equality of opportunity in the domestic context, I suggest, we should condemn
immigration restrictions for undermining global equality of opportunity." Howard
Chang, Cultural Communities in a Global Labor Market: Immigration Restrictions as Residential Segregation, working paper dated 2006, at 10, available at http://lsr.nellco.orgupenn/wps/papers/90.
18.

DA.N RODRIK, How TO MAKE THE TRADE REGIME WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT (2004),

available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-drodrik/How%20to%2OMake%20Trade%20
Work.pdf.
19. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL: THE FATE OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1999).

20. Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (describing earlier restrictions).
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on modes of delivery of services other than those that require immigration. 2 1 By contrast, poor countries have tremendous advantages in
unskilled and semi-skilled services, which largely were excluded from
GATS, both because their subject matter was not covered, and because the
mode of exchange for these services is physical movement of the service
provider. "Mode 4" of GATS covers services provided through the presence
of natural persons of one state in the territory of another. Within Mode 4
of GATS, our discussion of trade and labor converges. Commitments in
this area explicitly exclude formal immigration arrangements, but it is also
clear that commitments in this area would be meaningless if immigration
were barred.
C.

Redistribution and Intervention

If we compare the domestic sphere in wealthier states to the international system, we see that domestic politics include a substantially greater
formal capacity for redistribution than do international politics. By formal
capacity, I mean that there is a centralized national government, with the
power to legislate and enforce redistribution. It generally does not happen
to the extent some might wish, or to the extent that Rawls advocated. Furthermore, given the greater domestic homogeneity than international
homogeneity, there is less need and scope for domestic redistribution than
for international redistribution.
As part of the Millennium Development Goals of the Monterrey Consensus, wealthy countries have agreed to urge one another to "make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 per cent of their GNP as [official
development assistance] to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent
of GNP of developed countries to least developed countries .... -22 Obviously, this is an intergovernmental and loose institutional structure-the
most modest department of redistribution. The proposals of the 1970s for
a Deep Seabed Authority to reap the harvest of manganese nodules and
other seabed resources as a common trust for development may serve as a
more transnational and institutionalized precedent. The European Community funds its operations, including its redistribution, through customs
duties, levies on agricultural imports, a portion of each member state's
value added tax, and an additional resource based on member state GNP.
There have been proposals recently to impose a "Tobin Tax" on foreign
exchange transactions and an air ticket tax in order to fund redistribution.
But simple intergovernmental redistribution would not be sufficient to
alleviate poverty. To ensure that resources, including redistributed
resources, are not misapplied under circumstances of weak governance in
many poor countries, some international institutional monitoring and con21. See, e.g., WTO Secretariat, GATS, Mode 4 and the Pattern of Commitments,
dated 12 Apr. 2002, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/symp-apr
02_carzaniga-e.doc.
22. Monterrey Consensus, UN Doc A/Conf.198/3, 22 Mar. 2002, para. 42. Even
these minimal goals are not being met.
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ditionality arrangements seem necessary. 23 Well-crafted conditionality
can have the beneficial effect of causing governments seriously to examine
their development policy, and can reduce moral hazard problems. I will
say more about this in a moment.
D.

A Systemic Perspective

Of course, there is a systemic relationship among trade, immigration,
and redistribution, as each serves as a partial substitute for the other. That
is, fewer people would emigrate if trade in goods and services were sufficiently liberalized to reduce the gap in incomes between home states and
receiving states, and if assistance were provided in education and other
areas that would increase the productivity of the poor. Less international
redistribution would be needed under circumstances of free trade or free
immigration, although more domestic redistribution may well be required.
These economic facts have important ramifications for ethical theory.
I1.

Crossing Imaginary Borders: A Critique of Territorial Borders in
the Law of Peoples

My discussion so far provides a background against which to pose
three questions. First, is there an ethical duty to open wealthy country
markets to the goods and services of poor countries? Second, is there an
ethical duty to open wealthy countries to immigration from poor countries? Third, is there an ethical duty to engage in redistribution from
wealthy persons to the poor in other countries? Given the systemic relationship that I have outlined among trade, immigration, and redistribution,
it is notable that ethical theory treats these areas differently.
Let us begin with the Rawlsian 24 analysis of the ethical responsibility
to assist the poor. As you know, Rawls argues that his two principles of
justice only apply within a domestic society. For Rawls, the factual reality
of political borders, which are territorial borders, is decisive.
John Rawls's work has been intensely criticized by other philosophers.
I will not advance a comprehensive, detailed, or original critique. But I will
describe a critique, tailored to the contexts of trade, immigration, and
redistribution, and to their systemic interrelation, drawing on the work of
Rawls's cosmopolitan critics.
This critique has more than an academic purpose. Nothing less is at
stake than the question of whether individuals in wealthy countries and
their governments have an ethical duty to open their markets to goods and
services produced by poor persons abroad and to immigration by poor
23. As discussed below, Rawls believes that the "duty of assistance" is limited to the
promotion of good governance. See generally Rawls, supra note 2.
24. See generally GLOBAL JUSTICE (Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001); FRANK J. GARCIA,
TRADE, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (2003). See also

Joel P. Trachtman, Review Essay: The Law and Economics of Global Justice, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 984 (2002); Joost Pauwelyn, Book Review: Just Trade, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 559

(2005).

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 39

persons, and whether these wealthy country citizens have a duty of redistribution to poor persons abroad. If we find no duty, there will be less basis
to build the political will for change.
A. Goal and Background Assumptions Regarding the Appropriate
Political Unit
All social scientists, perhaps especially economists, must be careful to
ensure that their methodological assumptions do not insinuate themselves
into normative positions. Rawls's goal in his monumental Theory of Justice
was to articulate principles of justice for a national society, and so it made
sense, as a methodological convenience and first approximation, in ideal
theory, to assume closed borders.
If a closed system were all that were required, however, he could have
described a global theory of justice, using that closed system. 25 Thus, in
this sense the particular selection of the state or people as the salient vertical unit of society is largely arbitrary and, therefore, like gender, race, and
other arbitrary categories, has no moral force for our purposes. 26 If one
defends 28
Rawls's choice as part of ideal theory, as Beitz does, 2 7 then the
"people" would be a mere variable rather than a substantive concept
related to the world as it exists today.
Another defense of Rawls' choice is that the principles of justice that
he articulated in A Theory of Justice are applicable only within politically
liberal societies and peoples. Thus, one argument for focusing on the state,
or the people, is that it may support an assumption of consensus around
political liberalism, which is a predicate for Rawls's domestic theory of justice. However, this assumption is just as problematic in a real domestic
society as it is in global society. After all, today it is as implausible to
assume consensus regarding political liberalism within a society as it is
across societies.
Rawls's main topic is the basic structure of society, defined as "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage."'29 In his later work, responding to
skepticism expressed by Brian Barry regarding the determinacy of the concept of mutual advantage, 30 Rawls focused on reciprocity based on a
"benchmark of equality." This reference to reciprocity based on a bench25. See Thomas W. Pogge, The Incoherence Between Rawls's Theories of Justice, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1739, 1755 (2004).

26. See Martha Nussbaum, Women and the Law of Peoples, 1 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 283,
294 (2002).
27. Charles Beitz, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 669, 680 (2000).
28. The distinction between "peoples" and states need not concern us, as Rawls's
intent is (i) to emphasize the responsibility of states to their individual constituents-the
people, and (ii) to avoid implicit acceptance of some of the powers he understands states
to have at traditional international law. Rawls, supra note 2, at 23-30.
29. RAWLS, A THEORY

OF JUSTICE,

supra note 3, at 84.

30. See Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in NoMos XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW at 232-34 (J.Rowland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,

1982).
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mark of equality also fails to achieve the intended goal of distinguishing
domestic society from international society.
As many have now pointed out, globalization has at least raised a
question regarding the salience, or exclusive salience, of the state under
this definition of society. 3 1 Again, lawyers can point to scores of international cooperative ventures for mutual advantage: all international law may
32
fit this description, and international law is a rapidly growing body.
33
WTO law is replete with references to reciprocity and is understood by
many as a system of reciprocal economic liberalization. The arbitrary
selection of the state cannot withstand much factual pressure.
International lawyers can exert pressure on the essential differences
between the national state and other subdivisions, or other supranational
organizations, and it is impossible to specify a sharp substantive distinction. Is a Swiss canton the right unit? What about a member state of the
EU? When in U.S. federal history did the states of the union stop being the
salient unit? The rise of the national state and the increasing globalization
of concerns and governance structures demonstrate the historical contingency of the state. Mathias Risse has used this data to show that even
those who are not reflexively cosmopolitan can no longer take the norma34
tive role of the state for granted.
It is strange for a moral theory to depend so much on such incompletely specified categories. Again, mere assumptions cannot be permitted
to have normative consequences.
B. Whose Original Position, With What Results?
Rawls begins with his well-known original position, in which each representative operates under a veil of ignorance as to his principal's actual
position in society. This original position is a heuristic, designed to generate principles that would be acceptable to each person without knowing
his or her actual position.
Importantly, in order to develop the law of peoples-which we might
recognize as strongly resembling existing international law-Rawls articu31. This question seems to have been asked in CHARLES BEITZ, POLITIcAL THEORY AND
(1979).
32. See GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS (Inge Kaul ed., 1999); Seyla Benhabib, The Law of
Peoples, DistributiveJustice, and Migrations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1779-80 (2004).
33. The third preambular statement of the WTO Charter may be cited as evidence of
the existence of a reciprocal cooperative venture for mutual advantage:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Being desirous of contributing to these objectives [raising standards of living, full
employment, expanded production, sustainable development] by entering into

reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce (emphasis added: the italicized
language suggests that the draftsmen were aware of the international justice
debate).

34. Mathias Risse, What to Say About the State, Harvard University Kennedy School
of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Feb. 2006, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract-890753.
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lates a second original position among diplomats representing "peoples." 3 5
Rawls thereby takes for granted an international, as opposed to a global,
world. He does so because he wishes to take the world "as we see it"3 6 and
work out a foreign policy for a "liberal people."
Furthermore, Rawls's analytical goal is sharply and arbitrarily inconsistent with his method in developing the rules of justice among individuals,3 7 in which he does not take society "as we see it" but rather takes
social rules as wholly contingent and subject to formulation ab initio in the
original position.
Rawls argues that in the domestic original position, representatives of
individuals would select two principles of justice. The first principle of
justice holds that "each person has an equal right to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme
of liberties for all."'3 8 The second principle of justice holds that "[slocial
and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the
least advantaged members of Society."' 3 9 These two principles of justice

would be implemented differently in different societies.
According to Rawls, none of these principles would be selected in the
second original position among representatives of peoples, and therefore
they would not apply across national borders. In fact, Rawls appears to
subscribe to a Westphalian concept of international law, 40 with ruggedly
independent states, and most importantly, where rights and obligations,
even relating to human rights, appear to be available only to states. This is
definitely, and intentionally, not a cosmopolitan vision. 4 1 Rawls concludes that his approach in The Law of Peoples is concerned not with individual welfare but rather with the justice and stability of liberal and decent
societies. So, under Rawls's law of peoples model, the kind of broad equality of liberty, opportunity, and redistribution available at home would be
unavailable to foreigners.
Yet we might ask why the representatives of peoples would choose different principles of justice than those selected by the representatives of
individuals. At least from a normative individualist perspective, peoples
are merely aggregates of individuals.4 2 Would not true diplomatic repre35. The distinction between "peoples" and states need not concern us, as Rawls's
intent is (i) to emphasize the responsibility of states to their individual constituents-the
people, and (ii) avoid implicit acceptance of some of the powers he understands states to
have at traditional international law. Rawls, supra note 2, at 23-30.
36. Id. at 83.
37. See Thomas Pogge, The Incoherence Between Rawls' Theories of Justice, 72 FoRDHAM L. REv. 739 (2004).
38.

RAwLs, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 291.

39. Id. at 6.
40. See Allen Buchanan, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICs 691 (2000).
41. Rawls, supra note 2, at 119.
42. For a criticism of the use of "peoples" from both an empirical and methodological perspective, see Benhabib, supra note 32.
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sentatives of aggregates of individuals select exactly the same safeguards as
the individuals themselves selected in the first original position? If, as I
have suggested, the "peoples" unit is arbitrary, why would the principles
chosen within a people be different from those chosen by multiple peoples
together? In order to posit a different selection of principles of justice, it is
43
necessary to assume a different set of concerns.
Thus, even if we imagine, as Rawls does, an original position among
representatives of peoples, we must understand the two-level original position as an integrated original position. That is, the representatives of states
should be assumed to represent their principals with perfect fairness and
accuracy, 4 4 not with the public choice and other agency problems that are
endemic in the real world. This integrated two-level original position, then,
should not be assumed to be different from a single global original position. Under perfect representation, a federal original position is not different than a unitary original position.
Rawls's heuristic assumption regarding the participants in the international original position results in the inapplicability of the principles of
justice, including the difference principle, the core redistributive component of Rawls's theory of justice. This is because, strangely, arbitrarily,
and counterfactually, Rawls assumes that states (or peoples) do not have
interests in the distribution of wealth. 45 Therefore, instead of requiring
conformity with the difference principle, the law of peoples prescribes at
the global level only a modest "duty of assistance," which does not have
any redistributive goal. 46

The recipient state may remain "relatively

4 7

poor."

Rawls's position is contradicted, however, by the consistent behavior
of states: no one can study the international economic system without recognizing that states seek wealth (among other things). Actually, the states
that fail to seek wealth are generally failed states: the states where dictators
are able to enrich themselves the most by declining to seek broad wealth for
their constituents. Shall we construct a theory of justice based on the preferences of failed states? Here again, philosophers need greater input from
economists and lawyers to develop a more plausible response of representatives to the original position.
43. Even assuming an illiberal people, it seems subversive of Rawls's domestic principles of justice to assume that individuals in the domestic original position would select
an illiberal political culture.
44. Rawls makes the assumption of fair representation in the domestic original position. Rawls, supra note 2, at 30-31.
45. Their interest is to live in a well-ordered (liberal or decent) society. This society is
one that can provide basic goods. See Leif Wenar, Contractualism and Global Economic
Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 76, 84 (Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001), citing Rawls, supra note
2, at 24, 34.
46. Rawls, supra note 2, at 105-20.
47. This duty is limited to an amount sufficient "to help burdened societies to be
able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become
members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples." Id. at 111.
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There are important arguments that Rawls's separation between
national and international society-that is, his particular conception of a
two-part original position, one for international and one for domestic principles-is artificial. 4 8 Political philosophers, including Charles Beitz 4 9 and
Thomas Pogge, 50 argue for a cosmopolitan approach, in which each individual, regardless of borders, enters into a global original position. Of
course, under this global original position, individuals (or their representatives), fearing that they might in the real world be among the poorest persons, would almost certainly decide on a difference principle, in the same
way that they would in a domestic original position. 5 As the risks are the
same, or even greater, the principles would be the same.
Moving to more specific concerns, under the law of peoples, Rawls
would expect the establishment of a trade organization, like the WTO,
among liberal peoples in order to establish "fair standards of trade to keep
the market free and competitive. '52 While Rawls does not discuss the
detailed political, economic and legal issues involved, this speculation
seems quite plausible. Why would representatives of peoples decline to
select global free trade, given that it is superior from a global welfare standpoint? Perhaps they would have some concerns regarding distributive
effects, but then they could agree to a formula for reallocating wealth. So,
regardless of the application of Rawls's domestic principles of justice,
under the law of peoples, representatives might agree to free trade.
On the other hand, under the law of peoples, Rawls seems to believe
that "a people has at least a qualified right to limit immigration. '5 3 He
articulates two reasons for this "right." The first reason is rooted in efficiency. For Rawls, restrictions on immigration serve to avoid moral hazard
in the form of failure to husband territorial resources. I discuss the efficiency, or moral hazard argument, in detail below.
Second, Rawls refers to Walzer's argument based on a desire to protect
48. See Charles Beitz, Does Global Inequality Matter? and Rainer Forst, Towards a
Critical Theory of TransnationalJustice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE (Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001);
Carens, supra note 16, at 257-58.
49. See Charles R. Beitz, Review Essay: InternationalLiberalism and DistributiveJustice: A Survey of Recent Thought, 51 WORLD POL. 269, 290 (1999), stating that "I believe
that the philosophical weakness most characteristic of cosmopolitan theories - although
not found equally in all of them - is a failure to take seriously enough the associative
relationships that individuals do and almost certainly must develop to live successful
and rewarding lives." However, Beitz accepts a federal possibility: "it is hardly clear that
a sophisticated cosmopolitanism cannot explain how local affiliations might give rise to
special responsibilities. Such a view would recognize the value to individuals of their
associations with domestic or local communities and argue that ethically significant
properties of these associations justify internal distributive arrangements that are different from, although not inconsistent with, what is required by global principles." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
50. THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989).

51. See Carens, supra note 16, at 257-58.
52. Rawls, supra note 2, at 43.
53. Rawls, supra note 2, at 39, n.48.
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a people's political culture.5 4 However, this argument seems susceptible to
an economic critique. Howard Chang shows that rational people would be
willing to sacrifice the purity of their national political culture in exchange
for the welfare benefits of international mobility. 5 5 Furthermore, it is clear
that distinctive culture (including political culture) can survive free immi56
gration, as we have found in the European Union.
Walzer's argument, as adopted by Rawls, would seem artificially to
insulate existing cultures from challenge, although Walzer concedes that
"the collective version of mutual aid might require a limited and complex
redistribution of membership and/or territory." 57 Indeed, Walzer would
go farther than Rawls. Sidgwick proposed that immigration might be
restricted in order to maintain an adequately high standard of life among
the members of the community generally-especially the poorer classes. ''58
Walzer cites Sidgwick's proposal as a "primitive and parochial version of
Rawls's difference principle . .

. ."

The important point is that it is a

domestic difference principle that conflicts with an international difference principle. This economic concern is real but may be addressed
through domestic redistribution.
We must fear that concerns for culture may be a disguise for irredentism. It is worth noting the argument made by Jean Hampton that "in most
of the world the concept of nationality is intimately connected to the
ethnicity or race (narrowly defined) of the members of that society.

5 9

Irredentism is morally questionable, and it raises important issues for the
"encompassing group" concept advanced by Raz and Margalit. 60 As
Carens points out, ideal theory does not require the elimination of all linguistic, cultural and historical differences. But nor does it mean that all
differences are to be preserved, or that all existing features of state sover61
eignty are justified.
Furthermore, most of the arguments for free immigration parallel the
arguments for free trade, which Rawls seems to endorse. It may be that
some states are hurt and some are helped by free immigration, and that
some individuals are hurt and some are helped. For example, states with
high quality public education systems may undesirably confer a positive
externality on other states through emigration. States that provide strong
support for handicapped persons may find that immigration imposes
undesirable costs on their systems. Therefore, we would expect representa54. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 39 (1983). For a summary and critique of
Walzer's argument, see Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1069-73 (1994).
55. Chang, supra note 17.
56. See the interesting argument by Kok-Chor Tan that nationalism can be reconciled with cosmopolitanism. Tan, supra note 1.
57. WALZER, supra note 54, at 47.
58.

HENRY SIDGWIcK, ELEMENTS OF POLITICS

296-97 (1881).

59. Jean Hampton, Immigration, Identity, and Justice, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 67,
84 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).
60. Joseph Raz & Avishai Margalit, National Self-Determination, 87J. PHILOSOPHY 439
(1990).
61. Carens, supra note 16, at 258.
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tives in the original position to agree to free immigration accompanied by a
redistributive mechanism in order to compensate those that are hurt by
free immigration.
C.

Liberty or Distribution?

I have been focusing on distribution, but, from a very practical standpoint, international borders restrict liberty. They restrict the liberty to
move, the liberty to engage in commerce, and the liberty to accept employment. It is worth noting from the outset that, at some level, these liberties
are included in Rawls's list of basic (domestic) liberties, protected by his
first principle of justice. 6 2 However, Rawls also stipulates that "[w]hile
some principle of opportunity is surely [a constitutional] essential, for
example, a principle requiring at least freedom of movement and free
choice of occupation, fair equality of opportunity ...goes beyond that and
is not such an essential. '6 3 While this distinction may make sense in
Rawls's framework, in a practical sense, freedom of movement and free
choice of occupation go a long way toward achieving equality of opportunity. So, we must recognize that Rawls's first principle of justice is supportive of free trade and free immigration to the benefit of poor persons.
But does the first principle of justice apply to foreign persons? Can it
be restricted to exercise by foreign persons from politically liberal states?
It would seem an artificial constraint on freedom of movement and free
choice of occupation to say that "you can have all the freedom you want, so
long as you exercise it at home." It would seem sensible and likely that
diplomats in the original position would reciprocally agree to extend these
liberties to one another's citizens.
Once we leave the assumption of closed societies, restraints on immigration seem to interfere with liberty in a way that violates the domestic
principles of justice. However, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls supports
restrictions on immigration. How should we distinguish between immigration and the freedom of movement and occupation? One way is to use a
guest worker category. However, guest worker categories, as second-class
citizenships, may be deeply problematic, if they do not convert into firstclass citizenship over some reasonable period of time.
Only after appreciating that these liberties have distributive effects, do
we find that international borders also have distributive consequences.
These consequences are indirect but quite significant. In that broadened
and indirect sense, international borders are also addressed by Rawls's second principle of justice.
There is a conflict between the domestic and international principles
of justice in the context of international immigration and trade. When
applied globally to the immigration context, the principles of justice would
suggest freedom to emigrate. However, when applied domestically in a
62. RAwLs, POLITCA LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 335 (including freedom of movement and occupation as "basic liberties").
63. Id. at 228.
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poor state, the second principle of justice requires that constitutional
arrangements be structured to benefit the poorest. It may be that brain
drain of the middle class would confer a detriment on the poorest, and so a
domestic difference principle would limit migration.
As Sidgwick pointed out, there may be settings in which free immigration and free trade, as well as foreign assistance, would be detrimental to
the poorest members of domestic society.6 4 Under these circumstances,
the operation of the domestic difference principle would either prevent
these cosmopolitan acts or require domestic compensation sufficient to
balance the damage done to the poorest. (Recall that the first principle is
lexically prior to the second. 65 ) So, in order to comply with a global difference principle, or even a global first principle of justice, it may be necessary to compensate those who are poor at home. There is a systemic
relationship between domestic and global justice.
D.

Moral Hazard and Regulatory Competition

Rawls derives a border of thought from a territorial border. It is
important to emphasize that his border of thought is largely based on a
behavioural assumption and seems more pragmatic than philosophical.
Philosophers need to engage with economists in order to validate
behavioural assumptions, such as the moral hazard assumption made by
Rawls. He assumes that people will only act responsibly in connection
with the stewardship of their physical territory if they are confined to it, in
perpetuity. 66 Importantly, this incentive-based rationale is not sufficient
even for Rawls, as he argues that the problem of immigration is not simply
left aside but is eliminated by virtue of the establishment of social justice
in a realistic utopia-within each state. Under a realistic utopia, Rawls suggests, people simply would not have any motivation to migrate. While this
is not completely true, there certainly would be less incentive to do so.
Will national societies have appropriate incentives to become prosperous if outsiders can simply invite themselves to the table, or if they can
simply call for a redistributive bailout when lack of industry has its inevitable results? If citizens could rely on unconditional global redistribution,
they would lack appropriate incentives to cause their own state efficiently
to achieve their goals-in economic terms, there would be "moral hazard"
or a "soft market constraint. '67 Rawls and other philosophers reject global
redistribution largely because they do not believe this soft market constraint can be overcome. So the moral hazard argument stands in the way
of both free immigration and international redistribution.
Rawls's argument, which Pogge calls "explanatory nationalism, '' 68
64. There is no clear evidence that free immigration, or free trade, would generally
prove detrimental to domestic workers. For discussions of immigration, see George J.

Borjas, The Economics of Immigration, 32 J.

ECON. LIT.

1667 (1994).

65. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 43 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
66. Rawls, supra note 2, at 8, 39.
67. Rawls makes this argument explicitly at Rawls, supra note 2, at 8.
68. THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 139-144 (2002).
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assumes first that differences in position result from governance choices,
and second that citizens are responsible for governance choices. Thus,
explanatory nationalism argues that if citizens could rely on global redistribution, they would lack appropriate incentives to cause their own state to
achieve their goals efficiently; in economic terms, there would be a "soft
market constraint" or "moral hazard." The argument is that because the
apparatus of the state exists and has responsibilities, the consequences of
69
failure must be felt by those who control the state.
While the underlying assumptions are suspect, 70 there is a sense in
which states and their citizens should bear the consequences of their
choices. Under ideal circumstances, we might assume that states are
accountable to citizens, and it seems that Rawls's duty of assistance is
designed to develop some level of accountability. However, in the nonideal world, governments are often not accountable. Furthermore, there
are other ways to make governments accountable than to leave their citizens in misery. Three important mechanisms of accountability are regulatory competition, international legal requirements, and conditionality.
Actually, free trade and free immigration may, under certain conditions, have beneficial competitive effects on governments, as well as on producers of goods and services. In fact, the very mobility that Rawls would
restrict is a critical assumption within the literature of competition among
71
governments.
It is entirely plausible that in a global original position, representatives
would not agree to closed states but rather to states open to immigration
and trade, in order to enhance regulatory competition. I do not want to
assert this argument too strongly, as I have substantial questions regarding
the mechanism and effectiveness of regulatory competition, 72 but I do
want to highlight this additional reason why, in an original position, openness might be selected. The critical question is how we can maximize
incentives for good government while minimizing punishment of innocent
citizens. This question has much in common with the sanctions debate
with respect to so-called rogue states, such as pre-war Iraq.
Furthermore, economists and lawyers have much experience with
moral hazard in the fields of bank regulation and insurance. There may be
ways to obtain the benefits of appropriate incentives for good governance
without giving up the possibility of "bailout." If this possibility exists, why
would representatives in the original position give it up?
69. It is also worth noting the "flip side" of this argument: that states would have
reduced incentives to become wealthy due to the prospect that they would be taxed to
help the poor. Of course, this argument has no more impact internationally than it
would in domestic society; the difference principle seems to survive this concern.
70. Tan makes an important argument that Rawls seems to accept collective responsibility for governmental choices, in a manner inconsistent with his domestic focus on
normative individualism. TAN, supra note 1, at 74-76.

71. See

ALBERT BRETON, CoMPETITIvE GOVERNMENTS

259 (1996).

72. Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction,3 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 331 (2000).
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A host of failed states have demonstrated that letting citizens absorb
the consequences of their governments' failures does not necessarily result
in governmental reform. The predatory state seems to benefit from a
vicious cycle of predation of its citizens, giving rise to further concentration of power and wealth that, in turn, allows further predation. Government officials may find that policies that reduce total welfare maximize
their individual welfare. Although conditionality as applied by the World
Bank and IMF has many critics, it is an example of externally applied discipline on the state-of a constraint that might reduce the problem of moral
hazard and disrupt the cycle of predation.
Conditionality is a form of intervention, and some call it a form of
neo-colonialism. Conditionality certainly reduces the bundle of autonomous state rights known as "sovereignty." But sovereignty, in the form of
absolute state control over its own affairs, has been oversold to poor small
states, and more specifically to citizens. Local control does not benefit
individuals when it is in the hands of predatory or incompetent governments-we must be open to a post-post-colonial possibility of intervention
in cases of failed domestic governance. If predatory governments can be
disciplined, through a regime of analysis, transparency, and conditionality,
it is possible to improve the lot of their citizens.
It may seem strange to be advancing greater international intervention
and conditionality, at a time when the policies underlying World Bank and
IMF conditionality have been hotly criticized. 73 While international governance is quite imperfect, to the extent that it can engage in a policy dialogue with poor countries, it is possible that useful measures will result
and will prove less imperfect than the alternatives. Mechanisms need to be
created to ensure and facilitate reasoned dialogue based on agreed principles, rather than diktat.
Even within a state-based original position, diplomats faithful to their
constituents might agree that if they empower states, there should be
restrictions on the authority of states and a possibility of international
intervention under certain circumstances-specifically, in order to provide
the constituents a minimum level of security and welfare. This is the role
of international law. Such an agreement might be compared to a form of
federalism in that the individuals would be authorizing a central, supranational government to intervene-to exercise jurisdiction-in particular
areas. Certainly diplomats faithful to individual constituents would adhere
to contingent intervention under some conditions.
IV. Welcome to Cosmopolis
Gosepath reminds us that "[iun its basic tendency, global justice seems
to lead-as Kant was afraid it would-towards a world state or-if that possibility can somehow be excluded-at least towards a kind of cosmopoli73. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Globalizationand Its Discontents (2002). But see, 'Letter
from Kenneth Rogoff to Joseph Stiglitz,' dated 2 July 2002, availableat http://www.imf.
org/external/np/vc/2002/070202.htm.
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tanism." 74 International lawyers know that allocations of authority are
complex, subtle, and fluid. International lawyers also know that international law itself is the first step toward a world state or, at least, that each
incremental international legal obligation is, by definition, a step away
from the national state.
The correct question to ask is not where sovereignty lies, but how best
to allocate each component of authority, recognizing the values of pluralism. Under a liberal, normative individualist, ethical framework, each of
us would enter into society to maximize the achievement of our preferences. Given variations in economies of scale, externalities, and preferences, it is natural that we would work together in different horizontal and
vertical frameworks. It is also natural, as mentioned a moment ago, that in
an original position as to each of our social structures, we would be concerned with distributive justice. 75 Furthermore, it is natural that we would
link our various horizontal and vertical social structures to maximize the
achievement of our preferences.
So, welcome to Cosmopolis. Imagine a global cosmopolitan original
position. It would begin with representatives not of peoples but of individuals. These individuals would pay no regard to political borders in formulating exactly the two principles of justice that Rawls derives from the
domestic original position. But they might also agree to establish subunits
called states, or peoples. As Rawls anticipated, principles of justice would
need to be worked out for different social units.
Considering the vertical structure of society, whether the sequence of
pyramidal original positions is top-down, from global to domestic, or bottom-up would not make any difference. Either way, the cosmopolitan
nature of the original position would draw on individual perspectives.
Either way, the deliberations would be recursive, and so would draw
together lower and higher levels of organization. In fact, participants in a
domestic original position, aware of global society, would choose precisely
the same principles that would be chosen in a global original position.
Similarly, participants in the global original position, without cultures
and without histories, would also stipulate some rules of permitted diversity. In this ideal context, there is no path dependence and so the participants can choose any unit of organization. But they would wish to
establish units that allow individuals to maximize the achievement of their
somewhat diverse preferences. This wish would give rise to a rule of constitutional subsidiarity, determining allocations of authority and responsibility to sub-global units based on preference maximization. Of course,
preferences here include preferences for cultural diversity, as well as all of
the rights to influence government, and to be protected from excesses of
government, that people would wish for in establishing sub-global units.
74. Stefan Gosepath, The Global Scope of Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE at 145, 162
(Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001) (citation omitted).
75. See RAwLs, supra note 65, at 166 (applying the principles of political justice to all
domains).
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And, provided that doing so did not leave any of us in Yasmine's position, we would allow for some degree of national autonomy. Of course, my
proviso can be understood as a basis for a rule of conditionality or of conditional intervention, including possibly military intervention. There is no
doubt that in the original position, we would approve a rule of military
intervention to halt a holocaust. As we have learned recently, the difficult
aspect of this decision is not moral but institutional: to establish institutions that can reliably and legitimately judge the need for intervention. It
is an implementation problem to be assigned to lawyers rather than
philosophers.
As within the U.S. and the EU, Cosmopolis would seek to institute free
movement of labor. From a practical standpoint, as Rawls suggested, free
movement of labor puts some pressure on welfare states and may perpetuate failed states. Therefore, it may give rise to some need for contingent
intervention or harmonization. As within the U.S. and the EU, Cosmopolis
would likely have free trade in goods and services. At some level, it would
be necessary to compensate those harmed by these measures.
This federal Cosmopolis would entail some difficult allocation decisions. But the decision whether to help a compatriot to obtain goods above
basic goods, while foreigners suffered without basic goods, would always
be unacceptable, just as the decision to give one's child a luxury before
taking care of the basic needs of a neighbor's child would always be
unacceptable.
Perhaps a federal Cosmopolis would have some degree of proximitybased tiering after basic needs are met, or more properly some reflection of
the human tendency to compare ourselves with those nearby. Perhaps it
would also have a kind of extended purchasing power parity concept,
which would accept that different integrated baskets of goods are needed
for a good life in different contexts. In the end, it seems clear that borders,
as part of the basic structure of society, must be structured-including features of permeability-in order to advance the position of the least
fortunate.
My basic premise is cosmopolitan in the sense of individual duty, as
well as individual rights, so we need to begin with the duty of individuals
as opposed to the duty of states or peoples. Should I really feel, like Clare
Booth Luce, 76 that I owe duties to those near but not those far? Certainly
76. It is fitting to refer to the horrifying, albeit presumably honest, statement of
Clare Booth Luce:
"Americans identify with America, and increasingly there are people-Poles,
Italians, Israelis-who identify with two countries. But I do not know of any
other identification that I can make, say, with the condition of the people of the
Sahara. I repeatedly see pictures in the papers of a starving mother with her
child holding out its hand. I think it would be hypocritical if I didn't say that I
would feel a little more compassion if one of my pet birds had broken a leg in its
cage in my own house.
Quoted in William Raspberry, "Mrs. Luce: An Awful Interview," Washington Post, Sept.
15, 1982. Louis Michael Seidman finds Mrs. Luce infuriating but right: "Anyone in this
country who spends money on a pet bird or, for that matter, on dinner at a good restau-
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the idea of the original position is to identify ideal duties, as opposed to
narrowly reciprocal real obligations. So the fact that a compatriot is behaviorally more likely to reciprocate should not, in the original position, make
a difference. And in the original position, distance should count for little.
V.

Slowly Moving Forward

Could it be that Rawls declined to apply the principles of justice developed for domestic society to international society because of the tremendously disruptive, even revolutionary, redistributive effect of applying these
principles in an international context? 77 If we consider Rawls's formula-

tion of the lexically prior first principle of justice, we see that even its liberties can be constrained in favor of public order. 78 As Carens points out,
even in a global original position, participants would approve restrictions
79
on immigration in order to avoid chaos and the breakdown of order.
An instantaneous move to global free trade, free immigration, and
broad redistribution would be impractical. Individuals need time to adjust
and might agree in the original position to make some changes gradually.
Over time, complex factors may provide natural and beneficial limits on
emigration that would not be able to operate instantly. It is easy to understand how one might back away from recommending-indeed, calling forthese disruptive changes, but it is striking that the position Rawls takes on
this matter calls for little change and seems difficult to justify within his
own framework.
An alternative approach seems consistent with Rawls's methodology
and could avoid sudden revolutionary disruption. Modeled on the experience of trade liberalization over the past 60 years, a gradual approach combined with adjustment seems intuitively appealing within a global original
position. "You are not required to finish the task, but neither are you free
to abstain from it." 8°
Such an approach would address at least all three parameters that I
have discussed: liberalization of trade, liberalization of immigration, and
redistribution. It would recognize the systemic relationship among these
three parameters and synchronize transition in order to minimize disruption. So it may be that most of the front-end work would be on trade liberalization, international transfers of resources, and conditionality. These
measures would be consistent, to some extent, with Rawls's duty of assistance and his approach to trade. These measures would have the effect of
reducing the demand to emigrate from failed states.
rant, a movie ticket, or a book about immigration policy must care very little about the
welfare of starving children in the Sahara." Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at

the Border, in JUSTICE IN

IMMIGRATION

136, 137 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).

77. This issue is touched upon in Simon Caney, CosmopolitanJustice and Equalizing
Opportunities, in GLOBAL JUSTICE (Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001).
78. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 212-13.
79. Carens, supra note 16, at 259.
80. Pirke Avot (The Ethics of Fathers) 2:21.
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Conclusion
Thus, we might understand Rawls's duty of assistance as a starting
point. Free trade in the products produced by poor people could also be
implemented quickly, provided that adequate adjustment assistance is
implemented in parallel, in order to assist poor people at home and abroad
who are harmed by this change. Expanded immigration could be introduced gradually in order to avoid disorder and allow adjustment, and in
order to provide time for the other parameters to have an effect that reduces
the desire to emigrate.
In the end, philosophers must take the lead in advising us as to our
duties, but they must accept the practical and empirical input offered by
lawyers and social scientists, and we all must recognize that globalization
has changed the factual context in which we work.
Once we understand our duties and commit to their realization, social
science and law may again be brought to bear to implement them in
domestic and international law and institutions. Social scientists can help
to evaluate the potential effects of alternative paths, and lawyers can help to
design and implement the social rules to effect desired policy changes.
These interdisciplinary problems are difficult and recursive, and so require
continued dialogues such as this one.
So, what about Yasmine? Of course, those of us who are well-off feel a
duty to her. Geographic distance, political borders, and the vagaries of
media coverage cannot be allowed to prevent us from recognizing and carrying out the duties that we would feel if she were near. We feel this in our
hearts, but in order to precipitate resolve and action, we must know it in
our minds as well. Rawls suggested a process of comparing our instincts to
our theory.8 1
According to the theory I have described, our duty is consistent with
our instincts. Our duty is to allow Yasmine to stay at home and sell her
products in our society, to allow her to join our society if she wishes, to
assist her in achieving good government at home, to help her to become
more productive, and to ensure that material resources are distributed in a
way that maximizes the resources available to her. In the long-run, we all
live under a veil of ignorance regarding our prospects and those of our
children. The story of our ancestors highlights this. Under this veil of
ignorance, empathy and reciprocity are joint and several motivations.
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